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Abstract. The transfer pricing mechanism is a tool commonly used 
to transfer the tax base from countries with high taxation in countries 
with low taxation. In the European Union, this financial operations 
generate significant tax revenue losses. In an attempt to limit the 
handling of corporate tax systems, many public authorities have 
introduced regulations on transfer pricing, but the effectiveness of these 
rules has proved limited, and they contributed to the increasing 
complexity of tax laws and to the appearance of additional costs for 
companies. A solution to the solving of the transfer pricing problem in the 
European Union is represented by the introduction of the common 
consolidated corporate tax base. 
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1. Introduction 
The role of transnational companies in the world economy has grown 
significantly in recent decades. This situation partly reflects the trend of 
national economies integration and the technological progress (especially in the 
field of communications). 
The internal financial corporation's system offers the possibility of some 
imperfections exploitation, resulting from differences in national regulations of 
countries. In order to avoid barriers and restrictions on transactions, 
corporations frequently used the tax arbitrage: the reduction of the fiscal 
“burden” by transferring tax profits located in countries with high taxes in 
countries with low taxes (Munteanu, Horobeţ, 2005). 
Currently, a large number of corporations have been structured to avoid 
the taxation in various jurisdictions in which it operates. The ability of 
corporations to use tax havens and offshore centers as part of their strategy to 
avoid the taxation has increased significantly in recent years and this is against 
the principle of fair competition and corporate responsibility. According to a 
study by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) at the end of 2008, tax havens have attracted worldwide assets worth 
USD 5,000-7,000 billion, but the exact amount of the capital transferred is 
difficult to determine precisely, because in these jurisdictions govern a certain 
degree of confidentiality. Although there are no clear figures about the extent of 
international tax evasion in the European Union (EU), however, a value was 
estimated: between 2% and 2.5% of EU GDP, i.e. between EURO 200 and 250 
billion. 
According to a report by the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee 
in 2009, the international tax evasion has generated following specific 
situations: 
  about one third of the 700 largest corporations in the United Kingdom 
did not pay anything in the corporate income tax in 2005 and 2006; 
  25% of US companies that hold assets worth over USD 250 million or 
income exceeding USD 50 million per year is not paid, also no income 
tax between 1998 and 2005; 
  the largest French corporations currently pay a tax of 8% in average 
real benefits, even though the official corporate tax rate is around 33%. 
The study “Promoting Transparency and Exchange of Information for 
Tax Purposes” by the OECD in 2010 estimated that tax avoidance practices 
used by corporations generate tax revenue losses of about USD 100 billion for 
the US economy and several billion Euros for many EU countries. 
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2. The transfer pricing mechanism 
The transfer pricing mechanism is a tool often used by corporations to 
avoid high taxation in certain countries. This can be illustrated by a simple 
example: the branch of a multinational company builds a car at a real cost of 
30,000 Euros, sold on the market at a price of 50,000 Euros. In a high tax rate, 
say 30%, manufacturing company should pay a tax of 6,000 Euros (20,000 
Euros × 30%). To avoid paying taxes in the producing country, the subsidiary 
sells the car for $ 40,000 euro to another branch (located in a more relaxed tax 
area) that will put the product on the market. Suppose that in this country 
corporate tax rate is 10%. The income tax of the companies group will be 4,000 
Euros (10,000 euro × 30% + 10,000 euro × 10%), achieving a significant saving 
of resources. For the producing country, however, this situation creates a 
significant loss of tax revenue. 
Transfer pricing is a term that refers to prices charged in transactions 
between affiliated organizations (sale and purchase of tangible and intangible 
assets, provision/procurement of some services, including administrative, 
financial, leasing, etc.). Transfer pricing is set at the transnational corporate 
decision-making structures, and can perform the following role: 
  reduction in corporate income tax payments or duties; 
  transferring income from countries with bans or limitations on profit 
repatriation. 
The corporate policy regarding transfer pricing is based on many factors, 
such as: 
  fiscal aspects of countries involved in the cross-border activity of 
member companies of the group; 
  currency legislation; 
  political and economic risks (for example, legislative changes, 
currency devaluation, etc.); 
  price level in the host country etc. 
Generally, transfer pricing involves establishing prices of goods and 
services traded between members of the group companies for tax purposes: the 
reduction of the tax on profits to the group of companies. By decreasing 
(increasing) prices of intra-group transactions, the corporation manages to fix 
the most of the benefit in the most permissive tax jurisdictions. 
After interviewing a number of 850 companies with cross-border 
activities in 24 countries worldwide, Ernst & Young organization achieved, in 
2008, a study that clearly highlights the growing of transfer pricing issues 
importance. The authors estimated that about two thirds of global transactions 
take place between affiliated organizations, such as transfer pricing at a level Gheorghe Matei, Daniela Pîrvu 
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that maximize the tax benefits is a strategic interest objective for the 
multinational companies policy. 
To highlight the importance of transfer pricing issues in the European 
Union, Weichenrieder Alfons (2007) has developed a model of correlation 
between the level of taxation on profits and the profitability of affiliated 
organizations. Analysing the situation of foreign corporations with subsidiaries 
in Germany, the author found that an increase of corporate tax rate in the origin 
country by 10 percentage points causes an increase of subsidiaries profitability 
(artificially generated through transfer pricing) with a half percentage point. 
3. International rules governing transfer pricing 
Repeated transfer pricing practices of transnational corporations have 
generated efforts to define the phenomenon and its regulation. The OECD has 
realized since 1979 a report on transfer pricing mechanism used by 
transnational companies, and in 1995 wrote the transfer pricing guide addressed 
both transnational companies and fiscal administrations. 
The issue of transfer pricing is becoming increasingly important in the 
globalized economy, as more companies expand their business beyond the 
borders of the origin country, making transactions of goods and services within 
the group. In principle, transfer pricing rules recommended by OECD provide 
the following conditions that a transaction must meet to fall under the transfer 
pricing regulations: 
a) the existence of cross-border transactions; 
b) the transaction take place between two affiliated entities; 
c) the transaction will be subject of a good, service or any other thing with 
economic value. 
Since transfer pricing may also have other purposes than tax avoidance, 
fiscal authorities should not automatically assume that companies with cross-
border activity is trying to manipulate profits, especially as, in some cases, it is 
very difficult to accurately determine the price market. Fiscal Affairs 
Committee of the OECD has created a set of rules to reduce the risk of 
misinterpretation or abuse regarding the taxation of some operations in groups 
of companies, implementing the so-called “arm’s length principle”. The OECD 
Model Tax Convention explains the essence of this principle: “[When] 
conditions are made or imposed between... two [associated] enterprises in their 
commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made 
between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those 
conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those 
conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise Transfer Pricing in the European Union 
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and taxed accordingly”. So, it tries the adjustment of corporate profits by 
reporting intra-group transactions to the conditions should be governed the 
relations between independent firms in comparable transactions and in a similar 
context. The principle of “arm's length” put independent firms and those 
associated with an egalitarian plateau in terms of taxation, avoiding the creation 
of advantages and disadvantages that could distort the competitive position of 
each type of entity (Bişa et al., 2005). Applying the principle has proved 
efficient in situations where they can make comparisons with other similar 
transactions made between independent entities. There are many situations 
where this principle is difficult: for example, if multinational groups active in 
the production of highly specialized goods. 
According to the transfer pricing guide developed by the OECD, there are 
five methods for determining them, divided into two main groups: traditional 
methods based on analysis of the transaction (“Transactional Traditional 
Methods”) and methods based on analysis of profit (“Transactional Profit 
Methods”). Transactional traditional methods are based on comparing prices, 
while transactional profit methods are based on comparing transactions between 
related entities and between unrelated entities through analysis of profit from 
that transfer. 
Methods for determining transfer prices based on transaction analysis are: 
A. Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) is based on the price compare of 
transaction analyzed with prices of other independent entities, when comparable 
goods or services are sold. 
For the transfer of goods, products, merchandises or services between 
related entities, the market value is that price which would be agreed 
independent entities, under the conditions of some comparable markets in terms 
of commercial for the transfer of identical or similar goods or merchandises, in 
comparable amounts, at the same point in the chain of production and 
distribution and in comparable conditions of payment or delivery. In this 
regard, to establish the market value may be used to: 
  comparing the prices agreed between the entities affiliated with the 
prices agreed as between independent entities for comparable 
transactions (internal comparison of prices); 
  comparing the prices agreed between independent entities for 
comparable transactions (external comparison of prices). 
B. Resale Price (RP): the market price is determined on the resale price of 
products and services to independent entities, less distributing costs and a profit 
rate. 
This method is applied starting from the resale price of a product 
purchased from an affiliate organization to an independent entity. This price is Gheorghe Matei, Daniela Pîrvu 
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then reduced by an adequate gross margin (resale price margin) representing the 
value of which the last seller of the group will try to cover sales costs and other 
operating expenses based on operations and to make an adequate profit. 
The method takes into account the following aspects: 
  factors relating to the period of initial purchase and resale, including 
those regarding the changes in the market in terms of costs, exchange 
rates and inflation; 
  changes in the situation and the degree of wear of the goods – subject 
to the transaction, including the technological changes in a particular 
field; 
  the exclusive right of the reseller to sell certain goods or rights that 
might influence the decision on a change in the price margin. 
C. Cost Plus (C+) is based, to determine the normal market price, on the 
increase of main costs with a profit rate similar to the activity field of the 
taxpayer. The starting point is costs of the manufacturer or the service provider. 
Where goods or services are transferred through a larger number of 
affiliates, this method will be applied separately for each stage, taking into 
account the role and specific activities of each affiliated entity. 
Methods based on analysis of profit are: 
D. Profit Split (PS) involves calculating the net profit margin obtained by 
a person from one or more transactions with affiliates and the estimation of this 
margin on the net profit margin obtained by the same person in transactions 
with entities independent or on the margin obtained in comparable transactions 
by independent entities. 
This method entails a comparison of certain financial indicators of 
organizations affiliated with the same indicators obtained by independent 
organizations operating in the same area. 
E. Transactional Net Margin (TNMM) is used when transactions are 
interposed between the affiliated organizations, so it is not possible the 
identification of comparable transactions. This method involves the estimation 
of the profit obtained by affiliated organizations from one or more transactions, 
and sharing those profits between the affiliated organizations in proportion with 
the profit that would have been obtained by independent organizations. The 
division of profits must be made through an adequate estimate of revenues and 
costs incurred as a result of one or more transactions by each organization. 
Profits must be divided so that they reflect the activities performed, risks 
assumed and assets used by each of the affiliated parties. 
Establishing the most adequate method for determining transfer prices is 
envisaged, in principle, the following elements: Transfer Pricing in the European Union 
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a) the method that is closest to the circumstances in which prices-subject 
to free competition are set in comparable markets in terms of trade; 
b) the method for which information regarding the actual activity of 
affiliated organizations involved in the transaction – subject to free competition 
is available; 
c) the precision with which we can make adjustments to achieve 
comparability; 
d) the circumstances of the individual case; 
e) the actual activities of various affiliated entities; 
f) the method used must match the circumstances of the taxpayer's 
business and market; 
g) the documentation that the taxpayer can provide. 
The circumstances of the individual case taken into account in the 
examination of the market price are these: the type, the condition, the quality 
and degree of novelty of merchandises, goods and services transferred; the 
market conditions that goods, merchandises or services are used, consumed, 
treated, processed or sold to independent entities; the activities and stages of 
production and distribution of entities involved; the clauses contained in 
contracts regarding obligations, payment terms, discounts, guarantees, risk 
taking; the special conditions of competition. 
When comparable uncontrolled transactions can be determined, the price 
comparison method is the most direct and sustainable way to apply the “arm's 
length”. Also, the fiscal authorities in most countries found in the price 
comparison method the most sustainable way to determining price transactions 
between related companies. Using transactional profit methods should be 
limited in case of exceptional circumstances, when there is no information or 
there is insufficient information for applying one of the traditional methods of 
transfer pricing. 
4. Transfer pricing problem in the European Union 
Current systems of corporate income taxation in the Member States allow 
firms with cross-border activity to avoid the taxation due to the existence of a 
significant differences between corporate income tax rates and rules under 
which each subsidiary is subject of taxation depending on its activity in the host 
state. The economic integration has complicated the corporate tax problems and 
diminished the fiscal administration's ability to monitor commercial flows and 
cash flows for companies with cross-border activity. The economic 
globalization also reduces the capacity of fiscal administrations to verify the 
accuracy of transfer prices used by taxpayers, through the significant increase Gheorghe Matei, Daniela Pîrvu 
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of foreign companies revenues and their diversification. To avoid the possibility 
of manipulating corporate tax systems through transfer pricing, fiscal 
authorities impose requirements concerning the preparation of some 
documentation related to transfer pricing, increasingly more onerous. Thus, 
companies are faced with the situation where they need to develop complex 
documentation on transfer prices in all countries where it operates, so they are 
much more likely to incur penalties for noncompliance with the requirements of 
fiscal authorities. In addition, the application of different methods for 
determining the correct transfer price is becoming increasingly complex and 
costly, given that new technologies and business structures (implying a greater 
emphasis on the firm's intangible assets) created difficulties in identification of 
comparable uncontrolled commercial transactions necessary for the correct 
transfer pricing. There are also substantial differences in the rules for applying 
the methods of transfer pricing between Member States so that EU companies 
face with uncertainty regarding the prices of intra-group transactions, because 
they could be considered unacceptable by fiscal authorities at a later audit 
(European Commission, 2005). The transfer pricing adjustment, made after the 
fiscal authorities audit, can lead to double taxation risk. For example, the 
double taxation through transfer pricing occurs when a fiscal authorities of a 
Member State unilaterally adjust the price for a sale achieved between 
companies of the same group, without this adjustment to be offset by a 
corresponding adjustment in the Member State in which the purchase was 
made. Although, researchers conducted by the European Commission suggests 
that the number of disputes between fiscal authorities and corporations 
regarding transfer pricing adjustments is quite limited in the Member States, 
business representatives have complained that often litigation costs are so high 
that the acceptance of double taxation is a less expensive option (Ernst & 
Young, 1999).  
Specifically, the costs that corporations have to commit for compliance of 
the tax liabilities regarding transfer pricing are following: 
  the company's obligation to determine transfer prices under the “arm's 
length, which means the finding comparable uncontrolled transaction 
prices, the development of documentation and the justification of these 
prices at any controls by fiscal authorities; 
  the protect against the risk of double taxation if transfer pricing are 
adjusted (bringing proceedings against the tax authorities, determining 
transfer pricing, etc.). 
According to estimates by the European Commission in 2001, compliance 
costs regarding the transfer pricing of European companies accounted for about 
4 to 5.5 million per year, i.e. 1.9% of corporate income taxes payable (European Transfer Pricing in the European Union 
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Commission, 2005). Estimates were made on the basis of an analysis of 700 
companies from 14 countries. Other authors have found that these costs would 
amount to 2% -4% of corporate income taxes paid by companies (Lanno, 
Kevin, 2002). The organization Ernst & Young' study in 2008, made at a 
sample of international corporations, reveals that 39% of subjects of the 
research believed that the transfer pricing is their biggest fiscal problem, 
because in recent years, fiscal authorities have granted a greater attention on the 
mechanism for determining transfer prices used by corporations. Thus, 52% of 
the companies that participated in the study have been subjected in the past six 
years, of an transfer pricing investigation by fiscal authorities, while 27% of 
them have proceeded to transfer pricing adjustments. Under these conditions, 
53% of those companies' representatives stated that, in recent years, the costs of 
compliance regarding transfer pricing have increased significantly. 
Since many of issues concerning the tax treatment of transfer pricing are 
obstacles for the activities on the internal market, limiting the efficiency, 
effectiveness, transparency and simplicity, the European Commission proposed 
in 2005 a set of rules for partial resolution of European companies difficulties, 
encountered by them in connection with the preparation of transfer pricing 
documentation.  
Thus, in 2006, the EU has adopted a code of conduct for documentation 
that affiliates companies in Member Countries must prepare in connection with 
transfer prices used in intra-group transactions. This code is intended to 
standardize the documentation that corporations must submit to fiscal 
authorities when the way of determining prices for cross-border intra-group 
transactions is checked. In February 2007, the European Commission made a 
statement which it summarized the results of Joint Transfer Pricing Forum 
activities, bringing additions of the code of conduct, specifying procedures 
regarding the dispute avoidance and orientations for Advance Pricing 
Agreements within the European Union. 
The measures listed above have the potential to help the reduction of 
corporate compliance costs regarding the transfer pricing documentation, but 
not entirely resolve the transfer pricing problem. For this reason the European 
Commission has repeatedly reaffirmed the need of the corporate income tax 
base consolidation as a solution for solving the transfer pricing problem. At the 
same time the European Commission pointed the need to ensure a good 
governance in tax matters among Member States as an essential tool to combat 
the cross-border tax evasion and fraud and to provide a financial base for public 
spending. 
The European Parliament also recently stated that the introduction of a 
common consolidated corporate tax base would help resolve issues of double Gheorghe Matei, Daniela Pîrvu 
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taxation and transfer pricing in the EU. Until finalizing a legislative proposal in 
this regard, the European Parliament recommend the Commission to move the 
emphasis of the inspection on transfer pricing transaction to the company, in 
order to diminish the ability of corporations to handle corporate tax systems 
through the transfer pricing mechanism. In this respect, comparable profits 
method is suggested for the transfer pricing determination because it focuses on 
the comparison of benefits obtained by companies for each industry. Thus, the 
decrease of a branch profits well below the sector average could be the evidence 
of a transfer pricing used by company to avoid taxation. 
In recent years, the outward opening of South-Eastern Europe 
economies and the increasing of the political stability in the region has 
encouraged the establishment of European corporations' subsidiaries in the 
respective states. If in these states there is no a transfer pricing legislation 
(Table 1) and it practiced low corporate tax rates, the risk of intensifying the 
phenomenon of avoiding the imposition by using the transfer pricing 
mechanism increases significant. 
 
Table 1  
Issues relating to the transfer pricing legislation and the rate of corporation tax in the 
countries of South-eastern Europe 
 National 
legislation follows 
the principles of 
the OECD 
National 
legislation 
complies with 
"arm's length" 
National legislation 
requires the 
development of a 
documentation 
Rate of 
corporation tax 
in 2010 
(%) 
Azerbaijan -  -  -  20 
Bulgaria x  x  -  10 
Croatia partly  x  -  20 
Czech 
Republic 
x x  x  19 
Estonia x  x  x  21 
Hungary x  x  x  19 
Kazakhstan  x  partly  for some taxpayers  20 
Latvia x  x  - 15 
Lithuania x  x  x  15 
Macedonia partly  x  -  10 
Poland x  x  x  19 
Romania x  x  x  16 
Russia partly partly  -  20 
Slovenia x  x  x  20 
Slovakia x  x  x  19 
Ukraine partly  x  -  25 
Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Transfer Pricing Perspectives, 2010. 
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On the other hand, even in some Euro Zone countries there is no 
regulations regarding transfer pricing (Malta) or no requirement to achieve a 
transfer pricing documentation (Luxembourg). 
5. Conclusion 
Since the transfer prices have important implications for the budgets of 
Member States, there is an increasing complexity of tax issues for both fiscal 
administrations and corporations that are forced to respect different tax rules in 
the countries where working. The different national tax rules generate interest 
conflicts between fiscal administrations and corporations, and lack of 
administrative coordination between fiscal jurisdictions can support the capital 
flight from some countries and the loss of tax revenue. 
The protection of national tax revenue has become a major target for the 
financial policy of all Member States but especially of states with a high level 
of taxation. In this context, the introduction of a common consolidated 
corporate tax base in the European Union can be a useful tool for limiting the 
migration of tax base between countries through transfer pricing, ensuring, at 
the same time, increasing the efficiency of the corporate income tax by a 
significant simplification operations regarding the declaration of the profit by 
corporations. The consolidation of the tax base will allow the determination of 
the taxable income for the group of companies, so the transactions price will 
have no influence on corporate income tax paid by companies. Because the 
costs of compliance with fiscal authorities requirements regarding the transfer 
pricing are becoming larger, this measure is supported by representatives of 
European business. 
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